ether.fi Loses 15.45 ETH in Legacy AtomicQueue Exploit; CEO Pledges Full User Reimbursement
Attacker exploited missing authorization in AtomicQueue’s solve() function, draining 15.4536 ETH from stale ERC‑20 approvals.
The exploit executed in a single transaction (block 25952624) using a wrapper, solver contract, and placeholder token, costing 0.000685 ETH gas.
Stolen assets were swapped on Uniswap v4 and v3, then laundered through Tornado Cash in multiple 10, 1, 0.1 ETH deposits.
Liquid restaking protocol ether.fi saw approximately 15.4536 Ether (ETH) drained from a legacy withdrawal queue on Friday, September 11, 2026, after an attacker abused leftover token allowances tied to an old Veda-built AtomicQueue contract.
The stolen assets are worth roughly $38,000 at prevailing market prices and were pulled from eleven user wallets that still carried stale ERC-20 approvals to the deprecated helper contract.
Chief Executive Officer (CEO) Mike Silagadze confirmed the loss originated from an outdated contract used by a small subset of users, said the issue has been resolved, and pledged that affected wallets will be reimbursed. Crucially, the incident did not compromise eETH or wrapped eETH (weETH) minting, the LiquidityPool, or the current Liquid vault accounting.
What Happened On-Chain
The exploit landed in a single Ethereum transaction confirmed at 07:20:11 UTC in block 25952624. The attacker’s wallet, a fresh address (0xa5CC6e49…B64Ea) with no prior transaction history, initiated the drain with zero starting capital, deploying an exploit wrapper contract, an intermediate solver contract, and a worthless placeholder offer token in the same call. Gas consumption for the compound transaction reached 4,410,842 units at a total fee of roughly 0.000685 ETH.
Blockchain security firm ExVul was first to publish a public alert on the incident at 07:51 UTC, followed shortly after by an independent threat-intelligence notice from SlowMist, which said it had contacted the ether.fi team privately before making the vulnerability public.
Both alerts converged on the same figure for the loss and identified the same vulnerable contract at address 0xd45884b5…ea07, labelled on Etherscan as the “ether.fi: Withdrawal Queue.”
Root Cause: An Unauthenticated Solver Field
AtomicQueue is the settlement contract for withdrawals from the ether.fi Liquid vault, originally provided by on-chain vault infrastructure firm Veda. In normal operation, a user pledges a set amount of the vault share token, liquidETH, in exchange for another asset at a chosen price, and an off-chain solver later calls the queue’s solve() function to settle the trade.
The exploit hinged on a missing authorisation check inside solve(offer, want, users[], runData, solver). The function accepted the solver address directly from the caller without verifying that solver equalled msg.sender, and without any signature, registration, or consent step.
Because the queue then executed safeTransferFrom against the solver’s allowance to settle the trade, an attacker could name any wallet that still held an approval outstanding as the solver, effectively redirecting that wallet’s tokens to a request the attacker had pre-staged.
To weaponise the flaw, the attacker minted a worthless offer token, invoked updateAtomicRequest() to file an on-chain request offering one unit of that token in exchange for as much liquidETH or USD Coin (USDC) as each victim’s residual allowance could cover, and named each victim as the solver. When solve() fired, the queue pulled the victims’ pre-approved tokens straight to the intermediary contract.
The finishSolve callback, ordinarily a safety hook that a real solver would use to react to settlement, executed as a no-op because the victim addresses were either plain externally-owned accounts (EOAs) or, in seven cases, Coinbase Wallet addresses upgraded through Ethereum Improvement Proposal 7702 (EIP-7702), a Pectra-era mechanism that lets an EOA temporarily delegate to contract code but which, in this configuration, implemented no protective logic.
Immunefi white-hat researcher kankodu documented the same three-layer stack for the largest victim: a bad callback assumption in the queue, a year-old dormant approval, and an EIP-7702 delegation from Coinbase Wallet that made the callback a no-op.
Victim Wallets and Asset Split
On-chain data show nine wallets lost liquidETH totalling 14.4455 tokens and two lost USDC totalling roughly 7.05 units, consistent with the eleven-victim count in the original alerts. The single largest hit was 12.366762 liquidETH from wallet 0x69da…47D4.
The remaining liquidETH losses ranged from 1.87 tokens down to 0.00055 tokens across the eight smaller victims, while the USDC losses stood at 5.69 and 1.36 units, respectively.
Where the Stolen Value Went
The attacker converted the liquidETH holdings on the Uniswap Version 4 (Uniswap v4) Pool Manager (0x0000…8A90) in three sequential swap legs of 2.2736, 6.0860, and 6.0860 liquidETH, netting 2.4728, 6.4949, and 6.4830 ETH, respectively. A parallel swap of the seized USDC through a Uniswap Version 3 (Uniswap v3) USDC pool returned an additional 0.002853 Wrapped Ether (WETH), which the attacker then unwrapped.
The total credited to the attacker’s wallet came to 15.453645063405167626 ETH, precisely matching the figures published by both ExVul and SlowMist. At Ethereum spot prices hovering near $2,470 during the incident window, that translated to roughly $38,000, in line with the estimate posted by CD Security’s Chris Dior.
Within minutes of the drain, the attacker began routing the proceeds through the Tornado Cash relayer contract 0xd90e…F31b in a staggered laundering pattern: one deposit of 10 ETH, five deposits of 1 ETH, and five deposits of 0.1 ETH, totalling 15.5 ETH mixed. A residual balance of approximately 0.03701 ETH remained in the attacker wallet at the last check.
On-chain researcher MrFoggoq separately mapped the Tornado Cash trail. The rapid handoff to a privacy mixer is consistent with laundering patterns seen in other 2026 incidents, including the Coldcard hardware-wallet operator’s routing of stolen Bitcoin through THORChain earlier this month.
ether.fi’s Response
CEO Silagadze addressed the incident directly in replies to both the ExVul and SlowMist threads, describing AtomicQueue as an old Veda contract that a small number of users had approved, saying the issue was resolved, and stating that impacted users will be reimbursed.
As of publication, the official ether.fi handle had not posted a dedicated incident thread, and a formal post-mortem containing reimbursement transaction hashes had not yet been released.
Under ether.fi’s published incident-response playbook, a confirmed severity-one event calls for a public acknowledgement within four hours and a follow-up write-up that details compensation amounts; that document remains outstanding.
The exploit sits within a difficult stretch for DeFi security. Earlier on Friday, an attacker minted hundreds of billions of unbacked synthetic Bitcoin (syBTC) through the Symbiosis cross-chain bridge, and the first week of September saw the Liquid Network compromise account for the bulk of a $322 million industry-wide loss tally.
While the ether.fi loss is small in dollar terms, it draws attention to a category of risk that is often underweighted by end users: hanging ERC-20 approvals to helper contracts that outlive the workflow they were built for.
What Users Should Do Next
Anyone who previously interacted with ether.fi Liquid through the Veda AtomicQueue is advised to revoke any outstanding token approval to the contract at 0xd4..ea07 immediately. Revocation can be performed through Etherscan’s token approval checker, dedicated approval-management tools, or the wallet’s built-in approval interface.
Approvals granted to any other ether.fi contracts are not implicated in this event, and eETH, weETH, and current Liquid vault positions remain unaffected. A definitive list of eligible reimbursement recipients is expected in the forthcoming ether.fi post-mortem.
Also Read: Liquid Network Restarts After $320M Exploit; Adam Back Says LBTC Peg Will Be Covered
Disclaimer: The information researched and reported by The Crypto Times is for informational purposes only and is not a substitute for professional financial advice. Investing in crypto assets involves significant risk due to market volatility. Always Do Your Own Research (DYOR) and consult with a qualified Financial Advisor before making any investment decisions.


