WAX Multi-Chain Bridge Exploited for Roughly $75,000 as Attacker Withdraws Tokens
Attacker exploited a negative fee bug in WAX bridge’s withdraw function, making withdrawals cost zero.
Fake WAX withdrawal records triggered legitimate payouts of $75,000 across Solana and Ethereum networks.
Bridge’s fee check skipped when fee equals zero, allowing unauthorized token releases without debiting attacker.
Security firm Blockaid has flagged an ongoing exploit on WAX’s multi-chain bridge connecting the WAX, Solana, and Ethereum networks, saying an attacker withdrew mapped tokens on WAX without paying for them, while the bridge’s Solana and Ethereum sides released the corresponding assets as if the withdrawal were legitimate.
What Happened
According to Blockaid’s post on X, the attacker created a new WAX account, fasdfas.al, at 09:06 UTC. At 09:46 UTC, that account withdrew 52,986.50 WAXUSDC from the bridge; a minute later, at 09:47 UTC, it did the same with mapped USDT, DAI, WETH, and WBTC.
The bridge treated these as legitimate withdrawals: at 10:00 UTC, Solana paid out 52,986.50 USDC, and at 10:05 UTC, Ethereum released its corresponding assets. Blockaid noted that the Solana and Ethereum sides of the bridge behaved correctly given what they were told—the fault lay in what the WAX side reported to them. Blockaid estimated roughly $1,522 in leftover inventory discrepancy between WAX’s books and what remains.
Blockaid identified the addresses linked to the unauthorized withdrawals on the WAX multi-chain bridge. On WAX the activity originated from fasdfas.al, while corresponding releases occurred from Solana address 4H1piNZ8LsYhZGYhkbJDbPDSghxRj3HWxJqVz5dve8Q7 and Ethereum address 0x01664E199991b2F3fe412c2DE5B9b7A0dcDc5070. These addresses are associated with the five transactions that moved roughly 52,986 USDC, 21,558 USDT, 840 DAI, 2.55 WETH and 0.11 WBTC—reported at roughly $75,000 combined.
The Root Cause
Blockaid attributed the exploit to a flaw in the bridge’s eth.token::withdraw function. The function requires that max_fee be greater than or equal to zero and debits the withdrawing account for the withdrawal quantity plus that fee. By setting max_fee the negative of the withdrawal quantity, the attacker made the total charge equal to zero, while the bridge still logged the action as a full withdrawal.
Because the fee check is skipped whenever the fee is zero, and the contract’s safety check amounted to little more than an identity check, the withdrawal went through without debiting the attacker’s actual balance. The releases on Solana and Ethereum were, in Blockaid’s words, “honest”—they paid out based on a WAX-side withdrawal record that was itself fraudulent.
Status: Still Unconfirmed in Scope
As of publication, Blockaid’s monitoring indicated the exploit path remained live and the contract code unchanged. The full scope of the incident, and whether losses are still growing, remains unconfirmed at the time of their reporting. WAX had not shared a statement on the exploit as of this writing. The Crypto Times will update this story if any more developments or updates emerge.
Also Read: Slice Protocol Exploit on Base Drains $41K as FundsModule Trusts Fake Payout Contracts
Disclaimer: The information researched and reported by The Crypto Times is for informational purposes only and is not a substitute for professional financial advice. Investing in crypto assets involves significant risk due to market volatility. Always Do Your Own Research (DYOR) and consult with a qualified Financial Advisor before making any investment decisions.


