CoinDCX’s $16M Sweep Failure — Inflows Tell a Different Story and Raises Serious Questions

CoinDCX’s $16M Sweep Failure — Inflows Tell a Different Story and Raises Serious Questions


Nearly $16 million in USDT that sat on a CoinDCX address, which the exchange had described as deprecated, arrived almost entirely through 88 bulk USDT transfers from a single wallet. This onchain data finding further complicates the company’s explanation that the funds accumulated because users continued depositing while an internal sweep failed. 

The transfers, which took place between late January and the end of March 2025 and included individual amounts in the hundreds of thousands of USDT, came from the address TSC5MzYDNqtp3HDpqCNpTAs5pnT7wt4Hrd. They accounted for the bulk of the 15.82 million USDT later drained from the TQKJQ deposit address on October 21. 

CEO Sumit Gupta initially denied breach, then admitted sweeping failure and operational loss absorption.

Liquidity provider linked to address TSC5 sent 88 bulk USDT transfers, accumulating $15.8 million on deprecated wallet.

CoinDCX claimed users deposited mistakenly, but internal systems kept deprecated address active through 2026.

CoinDCX has said the balance built up on addresses compromised in its July 2025 incident after users kept depositing and a sweeping process failed, with the problem only identified the following morning. The concentrated inflows from one source sit uneasily with that account.

The outflow itself, the exchange’s initial denial that its wallets had been breached, its later admission of operational losses, and the subsequent Tether freezes have already been reported. The origin of the largest balance has received less attention. 

The Single-Source Inflows and the Liquidity Provider Question

CoinDCX has said that after the July 2025 incident it advised users not to deposit to the compromised addresses and that those addresses were deprecated. In its later update, the exchange attributed the accumulation and the subsequent loss to a period when the sweeping process that normally consolidated such deposits failed, with the problem only identified on the morning of October 22. All affected users, the exchange said, were credited anyway, and the loss was absorbed from company resources. Active wallets and segregated cold storage were unaffected. 

Onchain data shows, however, that the largest balance did not arrive as a scatter of ordinary retail deposits. Eighty-eight transfers from the above-mentioned address (TSC5) over roughly two months, many of them substantial, look more like structured activity than users pasting an old address by mistake.

Earlier deposits into TQKJQ had typically been forwarded onward quickly. The large pile from TSC5 sat for months. Forwarding of newer deposits later resumed, but the accumulated balance from that single source remained untouched until the October drain. 

Blockchain security researcher ZachXBT had earlier linked continued activity on the TQKJQ address itself to a liquidity provider (LP) that kept routing deposits and interacting with CoinDCX hot wallets into April and May 2026—months after the July 2025 incident and well after the addresses were supposedly deprecated. Onchain data shows the concentrated inflows from TSC5 occurred in the first quarter of 2025, before that later activity. 

The same address has continued to receive USDT from hundreds of other wallets since early September and was still active around the time of the incident. No public label has been attached to it. If TSC5 is the liquidity provider ZachXBT described, or is controlled by the same party, that relationship has not been disclosed. If it is a separate counterparty, the exchange has still not explained why large, repeated transfers continued to a known compromised address. Either reading makes the simple “users kept depositing” framing incomplete.

Why Users Would Not Ordinarily Reach Deprecated Addresses

A further difficulty with the exchange’s account is practical. In normal operation, users do not choose deposit addresses themselves. CoinDCX shows each user the address that should be used inside their own account on the app or website. Once an address has been deprecated after a security incident, the platform is expected to stop displaying it and to warn against its use. The idea that large numbers of ordinary users independently continued to send funds to addresses the exchange no longer showed them is difficult to reconcile with how centralized exchange deposit flows work. 

The concentrated transfers from a single source make the picture still less consistent with retail error. A liquidity provider or other professional counterparty dealing with CoinDCX would, in ordinary circumstances, be aware that the address in question had been compromised in the July 2025 incident. Choosing to continue sending bulk USDT to that address after the compromise had been public is, at minimum, an operational choice that requires explanation. The exchange’s initial response did not address it. 

On October 22, CEO Sumit Gupta described the flagged activity as a false alarm and stated that CoinDCX wallets were not breached and that the old addresses had not been used since the prior incident. Hours later the company acknowledged the sweeping failure and said it had absorbed operational losses. The rapid shift from categorical denial to partial confirmation, without accompanying detail on the source of the funds or independent verification of the user credits, left the questions larger rather than smaller.

Detection, Duration, and the Absence of Proof

The sweep-failure explanation itself remains thin on timing and detection. CoinDCX indicated that the process failed for “a particular period” and that the issue was identified only on the morning of October 22—the day after the large outflow became public. How long was that period? Were internal alerts raised and not escalated, or did monitoring simply miss a multi-million-dollar balance sitting on a previously compromised address? 

Deposits into TQKJQ were, by the exchange’s own design, supposed to be swept for accounting and security. Leaving the proceeds of 88 large transfers sitting for months implies either inadequate monitoring or a decision to treat that balance differently from ordinary user deposits.

Even after the admission, key details have not been supplied. The exchange has said all affected deposits were credited despite having been sent to deprecated addresses. It has not publicly specified the number of users involved, the exact window of the sweep failure, or provided independent verification that the credits came from company resources rather than other customer balances. Proof-of-reserves figures and protection-fund disclosures referenced in earlier statements do not directly address this concentrated exposure. Without that reconciliation, the absorption claim rests largely on the exchange’s assertion.

Residual Risk and the Cost of Incomplete Answers 

The episode also leaves open questions about residual risk from infrastructure that was supposed to have been retired. Addresses generated in early 2025 and compromised in July continued to receive funds—and, according to onchain records, interacted with current systems—well into 2026. Even if the October drain was the result of a process failure rather than fresh key compromise, the ability of large balances to accumulate and sit on those addresses raises the possibility of further exposure if access paths were never fully closed. 

CoinDCX has urged users to verify current deposit addresses only through the official app or website and has said current central and user addresses were not impacted. That guidance is useful, but it does not explain how the exchange intends to prevent similar accumulation on any remaining deprecated infrastructure. 

Tether’s freeze of roughly $2.2 million linked to the outflow showed that some funds remained trackable in the short term. Most of the rest moved through other exchanges and services. The freeze clarifies neither the original source of the funds nor the adequacy of CoinDCX’s internal controls. It does illustrate that external parties can sometimes act on visible onchain movements more quickly than an exchange’s own monitoring when large amounts are involved.

For users, the practical questions remain direct. How many customers were affected by deposits to the deprecated addresses, and over what period? What independent evidence exists that those balances were fully credited from company funds? What additional controls have been put in place so that addresses from the 2025 incident cannot accumulate further material balances? And does the exchange have, or has it had, any relationship with the TSC5 address that would explain the concentrated inflows?

The sequence of statements—first a firm denial that the addresses were still in use, then a partial confirmation of operational losses absorbed without granular proof—has not resolved the underlying issues. 

Meanwhile onchain data confirms structured, large-scale transfers from a single source into a previously compromised address that users would not normally be shown inside the CoinDCX interface. A professional counterparty continuing to send bulk funds to that address after the July 2025 incident is difficult to square with ordinary operational caution. Until those points are addressed with specific, verifiable detail, the sweep-failure account, while not necessarily false, remains incomplete. The 88 transfers from TSC5MzYDNqtp3HDpqCNpTAs5pnT7wt4Hrd are a concrete, publicly observable fact. They continue to require an equally concrete explanation. 

The Crypto Times reached out to the CoinDCX team with questions about the inflows, which remain unanswered as of publication.

(This article focuses on unresolved questions arising from onchain records and public statements. It does not allege specific wrongdoing beyond what has been publicly claimed or documented. CoinDCX has maintained that user funds remain safe and that the losses were operational and absorbed.)

Also read: SBI Data Breach: 3,897 Customer Records on the Dark Web. Can Blockchain Protect India’s Banks?


Disclaimer: The information researched and reported by The Crypto Times is for informational purposes only and is not a substitute for professional financial advice. Investing in crypto assets involves significant risk due to market volatility. Always Do Your Own Research (DYOR) and consult with a qualified Financial Advisor before making any investment decisions.





Leave a Reply

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *