Zcash Draft Seeks to Redirect 8% Mining Rewards From Grants to Network Reserve
Sean Bowe, Zcash cofounder, has proposed cutting off one of the two channels that currently pay for the network’s development. In a draft ZIP published on GitHub on Oct. 26, 2026, Bowe proposes ending Zcash Community Grants’ (ZCG) 8% share of new coin issuance and routing it instead into the Network Sustainability Mechanism (NSM), a reserve built to support the network once block subsidies taper off.
Redirecting ZCG’s 8% issuance (~68 M USD annually) to NSM shifts roughly $68 M yearly from grants to a reserve.
ZCG’s $8.8 M treasury could fund grants for 5‑12 years, but losing the 8% stream cuts future financing.
Miners stand to gain a larger share of block subsidies if ZCG funding ends, raising potential market concentration.
What the Proposal Actually Changes
The draft ZIP, titled “Ending the ZCG Funding Stream in Favor of the NSM,” was published on GitHub on Oct. 26, 2026, by Zcash core developer Sean Bowe, known in the community by his handle ebfull. It has not yet been assigned a ZIP number, is marked “Draft,” and its reference implementation section currently reads “None yet.” It is explicitly not part of NU7, the network upgrade currently specified in ZIP 259.
At its core, the proposal would end the 8% share of each block’s coin issuance that currently funds Zcash Community Grants (ZCG) and redirect that same 8% to the Network Sustainability Mechanism (NSM) instead. The NSM, defined in ZIP 237, is a protocol-level mechanism that reissues previously withheld value over time to support the network after block subsidies taper off; the pool of value it holds is called the NSM Value Balance.
Three things the proposal explicitly leaves untouched:
- ZCG’s existing treasury. ZCG would keep every ZEC it currently holds and could keep making grants from that balance under its existing rules.
- The 12% Coinholder-Controlled Fund (CCF) stream. Its allocation and duration are unchanged.
- Historical block validity, monetary bounds, and existing transaction formats. No new transaction fields or address types are introduced.
Mechanically, the redirected 8% flows to a new accounting stream called FS_NSM_H3, credited to a symbolic recipient (NSM_FUND) that has no address or spending key of its own—it is a ledger entry, not a spendable output, and does not increase Zcash’s total issued supply. The change would take effect at a future “activation height” that the ZIP does not specify; that height depends on other upgrades (NU7 and a revision to ZIP 214) and would need to be set by a separate deployment ZIP before it could go live.
In short: this is a proposal to stop future ZCG funding and reroute it to a different reserve, not a proposal to seize ZCG’s current funds or shut the program down outright.
The Case Bowe Makes for It
The proposal’s rationale rests heavily on how much ZCG already holds versus how much it spends. Citing a ZCG dashboard, the ZIP puts the program’s current treasury at 91,452.98 ZEC and about $8.8 million, with roughly $2.4 million in outstanding grant liabilities. Net of those liabilities, Bowe values the remaining holdings at approximately $125.3 million at $1,300 per ZEC, $97.8 million at $1,000 per ZEC, or $52.1 million at $500 per ZEC—a wide range that itself signals how exposed the treasury’s dollar value is to ZEC’s price.
Against that, the proposal cites a Financial Privacy Foundation report putting ZCG’s Q1 2026 expenses at $1,530,844, or about $6.12 million annualized. Using an illustrative $10 million a year spending rate, Bowe calculates the existing treasury alone would cover roughly 12.5 years of grants at $1,300/ZEC, or 5.2 years even at a depressed $500/ZEC. Meanwhile, the 8% stream the ZIP would eliminate is currently worth about 144 ZEC per day, or 52,560 ZEC a year—roughly $68.3 million annually at $1,300/ZEC, more than eleven times the annualized Q1 spending figure.
Beyond the numbers, Bowe’s stated argument is about governance, not just arithmetic: a fixed percentage of new issuance grows in dollar terms as ZEC’s price rises, regardless of whether the recipient needs more money, and he argues that continuing to grow a discretionary treasury increases the network’s dependence on that treasury’s custody and governance. He frames redirecting the stream to the NSM—and, implicitly, toward coinholder-decided outcomes—as the more accountable path.
It’s worth noting the ZIP’s own caveat here: it states plainly that the dashboard figures it relies on are “reported inputs” that “have not been independently reconciled,” and that the underlying worksheet is marked “Updates required.” The financial case for the proposal is built on numbers its own author says haven’t been fully verified yet.
The Forum Fight That Followed
Bowe’s ZIP didn’t land in a vacuum. A day earlier, on Oct. 26, a forum thread titled “End ZCG and send its funds to the NSM” was started on the Zcash Community Forum by a user going by maxdesalle — and it’s worth being clear that this is a related but different proposal, not the same one. Where Bowe’s ZIP only redirects the future 8% stream and leaves ZCG’s current treasury alone, maxdesalle’s version goes further: It would stop ZCG from approving any new grants once NU8 activates, honor milestones already committed, and sweep ZCG’s entire remaining treasury into the NSM.
One disclosure matters here: Maxdesalle states upfront that they work with Cypherpunk, described as “a large Zcash miner,” and frames the proposal as personal rather than official. Since miners are the group that stands to receive a larger effective share of the block subsidy if ZCG’s stream disappears, that’s a direct financial interest readers should weigh against the proposal’s framing.
The case for ending ZCG, as laid out in the thread, centers on accountability: coinholders are diluted to fund ZCG, the argument goes, yet grants are approved by ZCAP, a roughly 200-person panel whose membership the Zcash Foundation controls—meaning the people paying have no say over who gets paid.
Maxdesalle backs this with figures on concentration: 72 ZCAP members, or 36%, have themselves received ZCG grants, and ZCAP members are said to be behind roughly 75% of ZCG’s payouts. The thread also points to a February 2026 coinholder vote in which 98.6% opposed Zcash Shielded Assets (ZSAs) while 70.4% of ZCAP voted for them—and notes ZCG approved another $455,000 for ZSA work that June, after the vote. The broader argument, citing economist F.A. Hayek, is that a small committee can’t know what the network should fund as well as a market-driven, coinholder-decided process can.
Pushback came quickly, most substantively from Zcash developer str4d, who argues miners already receive roughly 88% of the block subsidy and that ongoing development work is as important to the network’s security as mining is. Ending ZCG without a replacement, in str4d’s view, shifts funding away from development and toward miners by default.
Str4d also flags a timing problem: the NSM doesn’t begin paying out until 2031, while ZCG’s current stream would end earlier, leaving a funding gap in between that the thread doesn’t fully resolve. Str4d says that the trade-off should be argued explicitly rather than assumed away, while still preferring redirecting funds to the NSM over simply ending them.
Other voices split along similar lines: thowar2 and Umbredak strongly support ending ZCG, calling the ZCAP structure a “moral hazard” and arguing coinholder governance has matured enough to replace it; seernet supports the proposal but warns it could trigger a prolonged conflict with long-time contributors who hold outsized reputations but few coins, and suggests negotiating a settlement to avoid a fork.
A third, more sweeping proposal also surfaced in the same thread from Josh Swihart, who has drafted a ZIP to end the entire development fund—including the 12% Coinholder Grants stream, which accrues roughly 216 ZEC per day until the next halving—and redirect those balances to the NSM alongside a one-time, coinholder-chosen Legal Defense Fund for Zcash developers. Swihart’s argument is that partial measures just invite ongoing political fights over which stream gets cut next.
As of this writing, the thread is still young and leans supportive, but the core disagreement—whether cutting ZCG strengthens coinholder control or simply hands more of the subsidy to miners during a multi-year funding gap—remains unresolved, and so does the question of whether Bowe’s narrower ZIP, maxdesalle’s broader sweep, or Swihart’s full dev-fund wind-down is the version that ultimately goes to a vote.
What the Funding Model Has Actually Paid For
Separately from the governance fight, Grayscale published research this month making the case for why Zcash’s protocol-funded development model exists in the first place—and what it has produced so far. It’s worth flagging upfront that this is a Grayscale research note, not independent reporting: it carries the firm’s standard disclaimers that digital assets are speculative and that the piece isn’t investment advice, and its tone is favorable to Zcash throughout.
Grayscale’s framing starts with the basic split: on Bitcoin, miners keep the entire block reward, while on Zcash, miners receive 80% and the remaining 20%—split today between ZCG’s 8% and the Coinholder-Directed Retroactive Grants Program’s 12%, the same two streams at the center of the current ZIP debate—go to funding development directly through the protocol itself. Grayscale notes most blockchains instead rely on venture capital or other private funding to pay for ongoing development, and says Zcash is one of the relatively few networks to build that funding directly into its issuance.
The research ties that funding model to a specific line of technical upgrades: Zcash launched with the Sprout shielded pool, added Sapling in 2018, added Orchard in 2022, and this year shipped Ironwood, which Grayscale says addressed a code vulnerability while adding quantum-recoverable addresses and formal verification—mathematical proofs of specific code properties, rather than just testing. Grayscale’s argument is that each of those upgrades was underwritten, at least in part, by the same protocol-level funding mechanism now under debate.
Looking ahead, Grayscale expects continued funding to matter across three areas: scaling the network’s transaction capacity, preparing for a post-quantum computing future, and defending against AI-powered cybersecurity threats.
The research doesn’t name a specific funding stream it thinks should pay for that work, but its core point — that Zcash’s upgrade history has depended on dedicated, protocol-funded development rather than one-off grants or outside capital — lands directly on top of the current proposals to redirect ZCG’s share elsewhere. Whatever replaces ZCG’s current stream, in other words, would be taking over a funding role that Grayscale’s own research credits with four straight shielded-pool upgrades over eight years.
Also Read: Zcash’s $550K Bet on Adult Industry Outreach Splits Its Community
Disclaimer: The information researched and reported by The Crypto Times is for informational purposes only and is not a substitute for professional financial advice. Investing in crypto assets involves significant risk due to market volatility. Always Do Your Own Research (DYOR) and consult with a qualified Financial Advisor before making any investment decisions.


