zkLink Nova Bridge Exploited for ~$786K as Forged Batch Root Drains Ethereum Escrow
zkLink Nova, a Layer 3 blockchain network built by zkLink, has lost about $786,000 from its Ethereum-side bridge contracts, according to blockchain security firm Blockaid. An attacker forged the data the bridge uses to verify withdrawals, then moved Ether (ETH) and a basket of ERC-20 tokens to a wallet they control. The main withdrawal was executed late on October 28, 2026, Coordinated Universal Time (UTC).
Blockaid flagged the attack on X in the hours after the withdrawal. It described the exploit as ongoing and said the main escrow contract had not been paused. Hong Kong-based security firm SlowMist later published a technical breakdown of the flaw and estimated total losses near $783,100.
zkLink must pause and audit its bridge contracts, likely delaying Nova withdrawals and affecting user confidence.
Regulators may scrutinize L3 networks relying on centralized operators, prompting stricter compliance requirements.
Security firms expect heightened cross‑chain bridge monitoring, leading to industry‑wide upgrades and potential insurance solutions.
The estimates differ because they were produced using different valuation methods and reporting snapshots.
What Is zkLink Nova?
zkLink Nova is an aggregated Layer 3 (L3) network that uses a zkEVM (zero-knowledge Ethereum Virtual Machine). An L3 network runs on top of Layer 2 (L2) scaling networks, which in turn settle on Ethereum, the Layer 1 (L1) blockchain. Rollup tracker L2BEAT lists zkLink Nova as a project that relies on external data availability and a centralized operator.
The affected contracts hold user deposits on Ethereum and release them when users withdraw from Nova. Before releasing funds, the contracts check each withdrawal against a batch root. A batch root is a cryptographic fingerprint that summarizes every transaction in a batch. The bridge relies on this value to validate withdrawals. If an attacker can cause the contracts to accept an unauthorized root, withdrawal checks may approve transactions that should not be valid.
How the zkLink Nova Exploit Worked
According to SlowMist, the flaw sat in the claimMessage function of zkLink Nova’s Arbitrator contract, which routes messages between connected networks. The function did not clear a temporary value called finalizeMessageHash after use. It also did not require a fresh, authenticated callback each time it ran.
The attacker used SyncL2TxHashRelayer, a relayer contract that anyone could call but that the system treated as authorized. They first loaded a valid hash, then reused it while swapping in EthereumGateway.sendMessage as the target. This made the ZkLink.syncBatchRoot function run as if it came from the legitimate Ethereum Gateway, which let the attacker install a batch root of their own choosing. The attacker then submitted withdrawal proofs that matched the fake root.
Etherscan records show the attack completed in a single transaction at 22:21:35 UTC on October 28, in block 26,294,188. The transaction logged a new batch root for batch number 116,409 and then finalized the withdrawals.
The transaction records establish the sequence of on-chain transactions. The explanation of how the vulnerability enabled those actions is based on SlowMist’s technical analysis; zkLink’s own confirmation of the root cause was not available at the time of writing.
Which Assets Were Drained?
Etherscan data shows the transaction moved 22.43 ETH from the zkLink Nova contract and 11 different tokens from the zkLink Nova ERC-20 Bridge. ERC-20 (Ethereum Request for Comments 20) is the standard most tokens on Ethereum follow.
All of the assets went to a single attacker address. Most of the losses came from pufETH, a liquid restaking token issued by Puffer Finance.
| Asset | Issuer | Amount | Value (Etherscan, Oct. 29) |
|---|---|---|---|
| pufETH | Puffer Finance | 245.74 | $615,138 |
| ETH | Native token | 22.43 | $51,823 |
| ezETH | Renzo Protocol | 12.57 | $31,481 |
| USDC | Circle | 18,113.45 | $18,103 |
| rsETH | Kelp DAO | 6.87 | $17,482 |
| STONE | StakeStone | 6.30 | $15,413 |
| WBTC (Wrapped Bitcoin) | BitGo | 0.1736 | $13,829 |
| mstETH | Eigenpie | 2.64 | $6,036 |
| mswETH | Eigenpie | 2.48 | $5,047 |
| USDT | Tether | 3,360.90 | $3,357 |
| wstETH | Lido | 0.466 | $1,340 |
| rswETH | Swell Network | 0.50 | $1,192 |
At Etherscan’s October 29 prices, the transaction totals about $780,000. This is in line with the estimates from Blockaid and SlowMist.
Where Did the Stolen Funds Go?
Within minutes, the attacker began converting the tokens into ETH. Etherscan data shows swaps through the MetaMask Swaps router and a 123.26 ETH conversion through Curve, a decentralized exchange. Between 22:58 and 23:01 UTC, the wallet sent 101 ETH, 100 ETH, and 102.06 ETH to three separate addresses, about 303 ETH in total.
Etherscan shows that the attacker’s wallet first received gas funds from a FixedFloat hot wallet several hours before the exploit. FixedFloat is an instant cryptocurrency exchange service. As of 04:37 UTC on October 29, the wallet held about $11,090, mostly in mstETH and mswETH tokens it had not yet sold.
Blockaid also identified a second attacker address. On-chain reports say that address later withdrew about 216.4 million ZKL, zkLink’s native token, from the same bridge. The tokens were worth roughly $42,000 at the time.
zkLink Yet to Respond
At the time of writing, zkLink had not published a statement, confirmed a contract pause, or announced a recovery plan on its official X account. Security researchers continue to track the stolen funds. Users holding assets on zkLink Nova may want to avoid interacting with the bridge until the team confirms the contracts are secure. The available reports do not establish that every zkLink Nova asset or connected network was affected.
Another Blow for Cross-Chain Bridges in 2026
Cross-chain bridges hold large pools of locked assets and rely on message-verification logic, which makes them frequent targets. By mid-May, The Crypto Times had reported that bridge exploits had cost $328.6 million across eight incidents in 2026. The largest was the $292 million Kelp DAO breach on April 18, which also involved a forged cross-chain message.
The zkLink Nova incident comes a week after Blockaid flagged a smaller exploit on the WAX multi-chain bridge, where an attacker withdrew roughly $75,000.
Also Read: Harvest Moon Exploit on NEAR Drains 1.04M GEAR and 25K USDC From Team FundszkLink Nova, a Layer 3 blockchain network built by zkLink, has lost about $786,000 from its Ethereum-side bridge contracts, according to blockchain security firm Blockaid. An attacker forged the data the bridge uses to verify withdrawals, then moved Ether (ETH) and a basket of ERC-20 tokens to a wallet they control. The main withdrawal was executed late on October 28, 2026, Coordinated Universal Time (UTC).
Blockaid flagged the attack on X in the hours after the withdrawal. It described the exploit as ongoing and said the main escrow contract had not been paused. Hong Kong-based security firm SlowMist later published a technical breakdown of the flaw and estimated total losses near $783,100.
The estimates differ because they were produced using different valuation methods and reporting snapshots.
What Is zkLink Nova?
zkLink Nova is an aggregated Layer 3 (L3) network that uses a zkEVM (zero-knowledge Ethereum Virtual Machine). An L3 network runs on top of Layer 2 (L2) scaling networks, which in turn settle on Ethereum, the Layer 1 (L1) blockchain. Rollup tracker L2BEAT lists zkLink Nova as a project that relies on external data availability and a centralized operator.
The affected contracts hold user deposits on Ethereum and release them when users withdraw from Nova. Before releasing funds, the contracts check each withdrawal against a batch root. A batch root is a cryptographic fingerprint that summarizes every transaction in a batch. The bridge relies on this value to validate withdrawals. If an attacker can cause the contracts to accept an unauthorized root, withdrawal checks may approve transactions that should not be valid.
How the zkLink Nova Exploit Worked
According to SlowMist, the flaw sat in the claimMessage function of zkLink Nova’s Arbitrator contract, which routes messages between connected networks. The function did not clear a temporary value called finalizeMessageHash after use. It also did not require a fresh, authenticated callback each time it ran.
The attacker used SyncL2TxHashRelayer, a relayer contract that anyone could call but that the system treated as authorized. They first loaded a valid hash, then reused it while swapping in EthereumGateway.sendMessage as the target. This made the ZkLink.syncBatchRoot function run as if it came from the legitimate Ethereum Gateway, which let the attacker install a batch root of their own choosing. The attacker then submitted withdrawal proofs that matched the fake root.
Etherscan records show the attack completed in a single transaction at 22:21:35 UTC on October 28, in block 26,294,188. The transaction logged a new batch root for batch number 116,409 and then finalized the withdrawals.
The transaction records establish the sequence of on-chain transactions. The explanation of how the vulnerability enabled those actions is based on SlowMist’s technical analysis; zkLink’s own confirmation of the root cause was not available at the time of writing.
Which Assets Were Drained?
Etherscan data shows the transaction moved 22.43 ETH from the zkLink Nova contract and 11 different tokens from the zkLink Nova ERC-20 Bridge. ERC-20 (Ethereum Request for Comments 20) is the standard most tokens on Ethereum follow.
All of the assets went to a single attacker address. Most of the losses came from pufETH, a liquid restaking token issued by Puffer Finance.
| Asset | Issuer | Amount | Value (Etherscan, Oct. 29) |
|---|---|---|---|
| pufETH | Puffer Finance | 245.74 | $615,138 |
| ETH | Native token | 22.43 | $51,823 |
| ezETH | Renzo Protocol | 12.57 | $31,481 |
| USDC | Circle | 18,113.45 | $18,103 |
| rsETH | Kelp DAO | 6.87 | $17,482 |
| STONE | StakeStone | 6.30 | $15,413 |
| WBTC (Wrapped Bitcoin) | BitGo | 0.1736 | $13,829 |
| mstETH | Eigenpie | 2.64 | $6,036 |
| mswETH | Eigenpie | 2.48 | $5,047 |
| USDT | Tether | 3,360.90 | $3,357 |
| wstETH | Lido | 0.466 | $1,340 |
| rswETH | Swell Network | 0.50 | $1,192 |
At Etherscan’s October 29 prices, the transaction totals about $780,000. This is in line with the estimates from Blockaid and SlowMist.
Where Did the Stolen Funds Go?
Within minutes, the attacker began converting the tokens into ETH. Etherscan data shows swaps through the MetaMask Swaps router and a 123.26 ETH conversion through Curve, a decentralized exchange. Between 22:58 and 23:01 UTC, the wallet sent 101 ETH, 100 ETH, and 102.06 ETH to three separate addresses, about 303 ETH in total.
Etherscan shows that the attacker’s wallet first received gas funds from a FixedFloat hot wallet several hours before the exploit. FixedFloat is an instant cryptocurrency exchange service. As of 04:37 UTC on October 29, the wallet held about $11,090, mostly in mstETH and mswETH tokens it had not yet sold.
Blockaid also identified a second attacker address. On-chain reports say that address later withdrew about 216.4 million ZKL, zkLink’s native token, from the same bridge. The tokens were worth roughly $42,000 at the time.
zkLink Yet to Respond
At the time of writing, zkLink had not published a statement, confirmed a contract pause, or announced a recovery plan on its official X account. Security researchers continue to track the stolen funds. Users holding assets on zkLink Nova may want to avoid interacting with the bridge until the team confirms the contracts are secure. The available reports do not establish that every zkLink Nova asset or connected network was affected.
Another Blow for Cross-Chain Bridges in 2026
Cross-chain bridges hold large pools of locked assets and rely on message-verification logic, which makes them frequent targets. By mid-May, The Crypto Times had reported that bridge exploits had cost $328.6 million across eight incidents in 2026. The largest was the $292 million Kelp DAO breach on April 18, which also involved a forged cross-chain message.
The zkLink Nova incident comes a week after Blockaid flagged a smaller exploit on the WAX multi-chain bridge, where an attacker withdrew roughly $75,000.
Also Read: Harvest Moon Exploit on NEAR Drains 1.04M GEAR and 25K USDC From Team Funds
Disclaimer: The information researched and reported by The Crypto Times is for informational purposes only and is not a substitute for professional financial advice. Investing in crypto assets involves significant risk due to market volatility. Always Do Your Own Research (DYOR) and consult with a qualified Financial Advisor before making any investment decisions.


