SlowMist Links $783K zkLink Exploit to Transient Storage Reuse
Key Highlights
- zkLink suffered an exploit involving approximately $783,000 on October 29, 2026, according to SlowMist.
- The attacker exploited a transient-storage flaw in the Arbitrator.claimMessage function to reuse a previously stored verification value.
- A publicly callable relayer helped the attacker reach a privileged gateway function and overwrite a batch root.
Cross-chain protocol zkLink lost approximately $783,000 in an October 29 exploit involving a flaw in its message-verification process, according to blockchain security firm SlowMist.
In an October 31 analysis, SlowMist traced the incident to the reuse of a verification value stored in transient storage during a cross-chain message claim. The attack involved two calls to zkLink’s Arbitrator.claimMessage function within the same transaction, allowing the attacker to reuse data from an earlier legitimate claim.
The attacker then manipulated the protocol’s batch verification process and executed 12 withdrawals using forged Merkle proofs. SlowMist identified one withdrawal involving 1 ETH and 11 transfers of ERC-20 tokens.
How zkLink’s withdrawal verification works
zkLink uses batch roots to verify withdrawals from its Layer 2 network on Ethereum. Each withdrawal on Layer 2 generates a message log, and the logs from a batch are combined into a Merkle tree.
After a batch is executed on Layer 2, its root is synchronized with the Ethereum-based ZkLink contract. Users withdrawing assets on Ethereum must submit the withdrawal message and a corresponding Merkle proof. The contract checks the proof against the stored batch root before releasing the assets.
The totalBatchesExecuted variable records the highest batch number the protocol considers executed. A withdrawal is accepted only if its batch number does not exceed that value.
SlowMist said the authenticity of the batch root is critical: if an attacker replaces a genuine root with a forged one, unauthorized withdrawal messages can pass verification.
The Ethereum-side ZkLink contract holds ETH, while its companion L1ERC20Bridge contract holds ERC-20 assets.
Attacker reused verification data through a public relayer
SlowMist identified SyncL2TxHashRelayer as the entry point for the attack. Its claimPrimaryChainSyncL2TxHashMessage function had no access control and forwarded caller-supplied parameters to the Arbitrator.claimMessage function.
The Arbitrator coordinates cross-chain messages between gateway contracts. During a legitimate message claim, it receives a callback through receiveMessage, which writes a verification value called finalizeMessageHash into transient storage.
Transient storage, introduced through Ethereum’s EIP-1153, holds temporary data for the duration of a transaction. Unlike persistent storage, its values are cleared when the transaction ends. However, they remain accessible to subsequent calls within the same transaction.
According to SlowMist, the attacker first used the public relayer to submit a genuine cross-chain message claim from Linea. The successful claim caused the Arbitrator to store finalizeMessageHash in transient storage.
The attacker then called the relayer a second time within the same transaction. This time, the attacker changed the source-chain messaging service to the registered EthereumGateway contract and supplied calldata intended to invoke its sendMessage function.
The remaining parameters used in the verification comparison were kept identical to those from the first claim. Because finalizeMessageHash had not been cleared, the second call reused the earlier value and passed the verification check, even though it had not claimed a new cross-chain message.
Gateway call allowed attacker to forge the batch root
The attack also relied on how the gateway and the main zkLink contract handled incoming calls.
SlowMist said EthereumGateway.sendMessage checks whether the caller is the authorized Arbitrator before forwarding the supplied calldata to the ZkLink contract. Since the call came from the Arbitrator, the gateway’s access-control check passed.
The attacker used this route to invoke ZkLink.syncBatchRoot with a self-constructed root for batch 116409.
The syncBatchRoot function checks whether the caller is a registered gateway but does not independently verify the authenticity of the batch root. It also updates totalBatchesExecuted when the submitted batch number is higher than the existing value.
At the time of the attack, the counter stood at 116408. The forged call replaced the stored root for batch 116409 and advanced the counter to 116409, making the batch eligible for withdrawal verification.
Forged batch root enabled 12 unauthorized withdrawals
With the forged root in place, the attacker submitted 12 withdrawal messages against batch 116409 using Merkle proofs constructed to match it.
The withdrawals comprised:
- One ETH transfer: Processed directly by the ZkLink contract.
- Eleven ERC-20 transfers: Processed by the L1ERC20Bridge contract.
SlowMist said the tokens were transferred from the bridge contract to the attacker’s externally owned account after the proofs passed verification.
The contracts also recorded each message as withdrawn to prevent duplicate submissions. However, SlowMist said this did not establish whether the withdrawal had genuinely originated from a Layer 2 execution.
SlowMist identified the following attack transaction:
0x4f3c23e75b9134e8cae5a462550daad42fbbc19242567fcc34c0a035e297462c
The firm also identified the attacker’s externally owned account as:
0xaca0655a11200a80d33d0e48786317304cde5718
zkLink suspends Nova operations and offers recovery bounty
Following the incident, zkLink suspended block production on Nova, applied emergency patches to the affected contracts, and temporarily disabled withdrawal channels, according to an October 29 post on X.
The team said it was reviewing related components and would resume operations only after confirming that the identified risks had been addressed.
In a separate October 30 announcement, zkLink introduced a bounty to support efforts to recover the affected funds. The announcement set out two possible reward arrangements:
- Security researchers and whitehat contributors: Those whose information materially contributes to recovering the funds may qualify for up to 20% of the recovered amount. zkLink will determine eligibility and the final reward.
- The party responsible for the exploit: If the attacker returns all the funds, they may retain 20% as a whitehat bounty. zkLink said it would not pursue further legal action in respect of the returned funds.
zkLink asked anyone with relevant information to contact its official X account or email team@zklink.org.
The protocol has not confirmed an agreement with the attacker or the recovery of any funds.
SlowMist recommends changes to cross-chain relayer security
SlowMist outlined several measures developers should consider when reviewing similar cross-chain relayer systems.
Its recommendations include clearing transient storage before each message claim and ensuring verification values are tied to the specific invocation being processed. The firm also advised reviewing whether public helper contracts or relayers could allow arbitrary users to indirectly access privileged functions.
For batch-root updates, SlowMist recommended independent verification rather than relying solely on the identity of the calling gateway. It also suggested preventing existing batch roots from being overwritten without proper validation.
These recommendations address the weaknesses identified in SlowMist’s analysis. The firm did not say that every cross-chain protocol has the same vulnerabilities.
Earlier SlowMist reports covered other crypto security risks
On October 16, SlowMist had warned about fake Ledger firmware update pages designed to steal recovery phrases. The warning followed the CryptoBilis-linked wallet theft, for which Bitquery estimated losses of approximately $93.2 million across 315 wallets on six blockchain networks. Ledger had not confirmed that estimate.
The report described how fraudulent pages imitated Ledger’s Genuine Check and firmware update process to persuade users to enter their recovery phrases.
Earlier, on October 9, The Crypto Times covered SlowMist’s analysis of separate attacks on BitBay and EtherVista, which resulted in approximately $32,600 in combined losses.
In the BitBay incident, an attacker exploited a zero-liquidity withdrawal bug in a Polygon vault. In the EtherVista case, an integer overflow in a swap check allowed an attacker to bypass the pool’s safeguards and drain funds.
The incidents involved different security weaknesses, and the available reports do not establish any connection between them. The affected assets have not been confirmed as recovered, and zkLink has not announced when Nova services will resume.
Also Read: Aave Restricts tBTC Lending After Threshold Suspends Redemptions
Disclaimer: The information researched and reported by The Crypto Times is for informational purposes only and is not a substitute for professional financial advice. Investing in crypto assets involves significant risk due to market volatility. Always Do Your Own Research (DYOR) and consult with a qualified Financial Advisor before making any investment decisions.


