Bitcoin Core Discloses High-Severity Bug That Could Stop Mining Nodes From Building Blocks
Bitcoin Core, the reference software implementation of Bitcoin, has published details of three security vulnerabilities that were patched more than a year ago. The most serious one is rated high severity. It could stop a mining node from producing valid blocks after a chain reorganization until the operator restarted the software. The other two are rated medium severity.
The project posted the three advisories on its website on Tuesday, November 10, 2026. Under its security disclosure policy, Bitcoin Core sorts vulnerabilities into four severity classes. Medium- and high-severity issues are usually made public about two weeks after the last affected release line reaches end of life (EOL). Bitcoin Core’s software lifecycle page shows that the 29.x line reached EOL on October 27, 2026. The lines still maintained are 30.x, 31.x and 32.x.
High-severity CVE-2025-62861 caused mining nodes to halt block production after reorgs until restart.
Bug exploited sibling eviction in mempool, ignoring bypass_limits and corrupting transaction ancestry during reorgs.
Medium-severity flaws CVE-2025-62860 and CVE-2025-62859 affected whitelisted Tor peers and allowed block‑processing stalls.
How the High-Severity Bug Worked
The flaw is tracked as Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) entry CVE-2025-62861. It affected the mempool, which is where a node keeps unconfirmed transactions until they go into a block. Miners use the mempool to build a block template, the candidate block they try to mine.
The bug involved version 3 transactions, also called Topologically Restricted Until Confirmation (TRUC) transactions, which are defined in Bitcoin Improvement Proposal (BIP) 431. In the mempool, a TRUC transaction can have only one unconfirmed parent and one unconfirmed child. These limits are node policy, not consensus rules, so a valid block can still contain a TRUC parent with several children.
Version 28.0 added “sibling eviction.” If a new transaction would give a TRUC parent a second unconfirmed child, Bitcoin Core can remove the existing child, as long as the new transaction pays enough under replace-by-fee (RBF) rules.
A chain reorganization, or reorg, happens when a node switches to a competing chain and disconnects blocks it had already accepted. The transactions in those blocks go back into the mempool under a setting called bypass_limits, which is meant to skip certain policy checks. Sibling eviction did not respect that setting, so it could still fire during this step. A restored transaction could be removed while its descendants stayed in the mempool, still spending outputs that were no longer there.
According to the advisory, a miner’s block template creation then “can no longer succeed.” The template fails its validity check, and the node cannot produce blocks until it is restarted, which reloads the mempool in a consistent state. Affected versions were 28.0 through 28.2 and 29.0 through 29.1.
Niklas Gögge reported the issue on September 26, 2025. Greg Sanders opened pull request #33504 with the fix on September 29, and it was merged on October 2. The fix shipped in Bitcoin Core 30.0 on October 10, 29.2 on October 14, and 28.3 on October 17, 2025.
Two Medium-Severity Flaws
CVE-2025-62860 affected nodes that used the optional -whitelist setting, which gives trusted status to peers from chosen IP ranges. Inbound Tor connections do not reveal a peer’s real network address. As a result, when the whitelisted range included the local Tor daemon’s address, every inbound Tor peer was treated as trusted. That removed some denial-of-service (DoS) limits and privacy protections.
The project said “thousands” of reachable mainnet nodes were whitelisting incoming Tor connections. Nodes that never used -whitelist were not affected. Pull request #33395 stopped applying address-based whitelist permissions to Tor inbound peers. The fix shipped in 28.3, 29.2, and 30.0.
CVE-2025-62859 let a malicious peer stall block processing through compact blocks. Compact blocks are a relay method that sends a short summary of a block, which nodes rebuild from transactions they already have. Affected nodes cleared a block’s download state before checking whether its witness data had been altered, which is known as malleation. If that check failed, the node asked the same peer for the full block and waited up to 10 minutes.
An attacker could repeat the stall indefinitely in two cases: if they controlled all three of a victim’s high-bandwidth peers, or if the victim ran in -blocksonly mode. Eugene Siegel reported the issue in April 2025, and the fix shipped in 29.2 and 30.0.
What It Means for Node Operators
These disclosures follow the project’s normal schedule, not an emergency process, and fixes have been available for more than a year. The high-severity bug mattered most to miners, because only nodes that build block templates were exposed. The Tor issue depended on how a node was configured, not on its role.
This is Bitcoin Core’s second high-severity disclosure in 2026. In May, the project revealed a separate bug that could crash nodes remotely. Earlier disclosures have shown that many nodes are slow to upgrade, including a 2024 bug that affected about 17% of full nodes. Operators still running 28.x or 29.x can find the supported versions on the lifecycle page.
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