Curve Finance Loses $38,200 in DAO Fee Revenue to CowSwapBurner Exploit
On Nov 10, 00:07 UTC, attacker exploited Curve’s CowSwapBurner, initiating forged orders that stole $38,200.
Within 17 minutes, 133 of the 138 fake orders were filled; the final one completed at 11:10 UTC.
Curve disclosed the breach on Nov 17, paused fee conversion, and proposed a new auction‑based burner by Nov 20.
Curve Finance said an attacker stole about $38,200 of fee revenue belonging to the Curve DAO from its CowSwapBurner contract on Ethereum on November 10. The contract sells collected fees for crvUSD, Curve’s stablecoin. Curve said “no user funds were affected,” and that its pools, lending markets, and crvUSD were not involved.
The burner approved trade orders on CoW Protocol without checking that the order it had inspected was the one being executed. The attacker used this to sell 135 small token balances held by the contract for USDC, with the proceeds sent to their own address.
Curve published an incident disclosure on GitHub and summarized it on its official X account on November 17, 2026.
How the Burner Works
Curve collects admin fees from its pools and markets and converts them to crvUSD once a week. Fees move to a burner contract on Monday; the burner sells them during a 24-hour window that opens at 00:00 UTC on Tuesday, and the crvUSD is distributed on Wednesday.
Since June 2024, the burner on Ethereum has been the CowSwapBurner. For each token it holds, it places a standing order on CoW Protocol, a trading protocol where third-party “solvers” compete to fill orders. Each order sells the whole balance for crvUSD, sends the proceeds to Curve’s FeeCollector contract, and accepts no less than 500 crvUSD. Before the incident, the burner had settled 6,420 orders and delivered about 20.5 million crvUSD, Curve said.
The Flaw
CoW Protocol checks whether a contract has approved an order by calling a standard verification function, ERC-1271, and passing it the order’s unique fingerprint, known as a hash, along with signature data. For the burner, that signature data contained a full description of an order.
According to Curve, the burner checked that the described order was one of its own, paying crvUSD to the FeeCollector with at least 500 crvUSD. “It never checked that the described order was the one identified by the hash,” the disclosure said. The contract’s code explicitly marked the hash as “Ignored here.”
“In effect, anyone could submit an order in the burner’s name, selling any token it held for any other token and to any receiver, and attach the description of a genuine burner order as the signature data,” Curve said. The only requirement was that the weekly exchange window was open.
138 Forged Orders in a Few Hours
The exchange window opened at 00:00 UTC on November 10. At 00:07 UTC, the first forged order settled, selling the burner’s YB balance for USDC and naming the attacker as the receiver. The attacker then reused the same genuine order description for 137 more orders. According to Curve, 133 filled within 17 minutes and the rest over the following hours, the last at 11:10 UTC.
The forged orders sold only tokens the regular orders did not touch. These were mostly balances below the burner’s 500 crvUSD minimum that had built up unsold over time. The median forged order was worth about $254, and only two were worth more than $500, Curve said. In total, the 138 forged orders raised 38,205.76 USDC.
That week’s regular fee conversion completed normally, delivering 97,317.74 crvUSD to the DAO. Curve said it checked all 6,558 orders; the burner has settled since deployment, and these 138 are the only ones not paid to the FeeCollector.
Where the Funds Went
Within four hours, the attacker swapped 37,611.76 USDC for ETH, split it across four addresses, bridged it to Arbitrum, and deposited 37,229.89 USDC into Hyperliquid, according to Curve. There it was exchanged for 65.41 XMR1, which Curve described as “a Monero-linked asset.” As of November 16, that balance had not moved.
On November 15, the remaining 594 USDC was swapped to ETH, and 0.3 ETH was deposited into the Tornado Cash mixer. “The funds have not been recovered,” Curve said.
Curve’s Response
Curve said it received an external report describing the vulnerability and the ongoing exploitation at about 12:40 UTC on November 10. At 13:59 UTC, the Emergency DAO, a group that can take urgent protective action, disabled fee collection and exchange on Ethereum, which stopped the burner from approving any orders. It did the same on Arbitrum and Base at 16:55 UTC as a precaution. Curve said no forged orders were found on Arbitrum or Gnosis.
Fee conversion on Ethereum is paused, but fees continue to build up and are not lost, Curve said. DAO vote 1524, which closes on November 20, proposes replacing the CowSwapBurner with a new burner that sells fees through a descending-price auction and requires the hash it receives to match the order it has checked.
“Users don’t need to do anything,” Curve said.
Warning for Projects Using the Same Code
Curve said the CowSwapBurner code is public and “has been reused outside Curve.” It said it notified operators of known deployments derived from it before publishing the disclosure. “Teams running a fork of CowSwapBurner should check their deployment,” Curve wrote on X.
Also Read: Lighter Pauses Withdrawals and Pool Creation After $15M Security Incident
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