Ethlabs Proposes Ethereum Go Post-Quantum & Post-AI by 2027
Ethlabs, an independent non-profit research and development lab for Ethereum, has asked core developers to make the network resistant to quantum computers, and, in its terminology, better prepared for threats from frontier AI, by 2027.
The plan, dubbed pqai27, was published on the Ethereum Magicians forum on November 11 under the handle “caspar.” Ethlabs said it developed the proposal after spending a week with core developers at Devcon 8 in Mumbai. Its central message is that Ethereum should not stop at post-quantum security: “Being post-quantum is not enough, we intend on being post-AI too.”
Ethlabs drafted the pqai27 proposal, urging core developers to embed post‑quantum and post‑AI safeguards by 2027.
Core developers must decide Hegotá’s scope, choosing between adapting Gasper or redesigning consensus for quantum resistance.
Ethereum Foundation’s Justin Drake set a 2028 quantum‑readiness goal, influencing the timeline Ethlabs recommends.
The proposal is an input into Ethereum’s development process, not an approved upgrade schedule. Core developers still need to agree on the scope of Hegotá, the upgrade after Glamsterdam, through the All Core Developers process. Ethlabs is asking developers to reconsider features that are not essential to the proposed security target, including features already planned for upcoming forks. It is also withdrawing its own Quick Slots proposal for shorter block times and moving that work to 2028.
What pqai27 Asks For
Ethlabs divides the goal into two stages. The first, “pqai-ready,” is targeted for the Hegotá upgrade in 2027. It would introduce post-quantum consensus and give every user a route to migrate their account to post-quantum cryptography.
Under this proposal, Ethereum would retain the capacity enabled by Glamsterdam, with the option of operating at reduced capacity if today’s cryptography were compromised before the full transition was complete. The second stage, “pqai-scaled,” is a stretch goal for 2027. It would extend post-quantum protection to transactions and data availability, including blobs, at full capacity and incorporate scaling improvements planned after Glamsterdam.
The “post-AI” label has two meanings in the proposal. The first is cryptographic: using as few mathematical assumptions as possible so Ethereum could remain secure if AI advances the discovery of weaknesses in the mathematical problems underpinning current cryptography. Ethlabs describes this outcome as plausible, not guaranteed, and does not claim there is an established timeline for AI to break existing cryptographic assumptions.
The second meaning concerns software security. Ethlabs wants Ethereum clients hardened against frontier AI models that could identify vulnerabilities at scale, with formal verification and stronger client diversity among the proposed safeguards.
That is why the plan relies on hash-based cryptography for signatures and aggregation, including the SPHINCS signature scheme for post-quantum accounts. Ethlabs argues that hash functions offer a more conservative foundation than cryptographic systems dependent on mathematical assumptions that could be challenged by future computing advances.
The Fork-by-Fork Plan
The central part of the proposal is a reshaping of Hegotá. Ethlabs wants Glamsterdam to proceed as planned but would make Hegotá the “pqai-ready” upgrade, pushing features that are not essential to that goal further down the development queue.
On the execution layer, Ethlabs proposes including Frames (EIP-8141), which allow account code to define how transactions are authorised, alongside the SPHINCS post-quantum signature scheme and other post-quantum account EIPs.
On the consensus layer, which Ethlabs describes as the largest and slowest part of the work, developers would need to choose between adapting Ethereum’s existing Gasper consensus mechanism for post-quantum security or moving to a decoupled consensus design. The proposal identifies this as a major technical decision that still requires further research.
Two features would be reprioritised to protect the timeline. Ethlabs wants FOCIL to be included in Hegotá only if doing so does not make the 2027 target unachievable. The lab points to slower-than-expected post-quantum progress and unresolved compatibility questions involving signature aggregation (EIP-8288) and a post-quantum version of Gasper.
Ethlabs argues that leaving FOCIL out of Hegotá could allow the execution layer to deliver Frames and post-quantum accounts on its own schedule, rather than waiting for the more extensive consensus-layer work.
Quick Slots, meanwhile, is being withdrawn from Hegotá outright and targeted for 2028. The decision is a notable concession because Ethlabs had previously supported the shorter-block-time proposal and still hosts a community survey on the feature. The lab says it continues to support Quick Slots and intends to work toward faster slots after prioritising pqai27.
Post-quantum data availability (EIP-8479) and signature aggregation (EIP-8288) would follow in a later fork to reach the “pqai-scaled” stage. Ethlabs says that upgrade could bring the consensus and execution layers back together and potentially include FOCIL.
For users, the proposed transition would involve a cost trade-off. Once Ethereum becomes pqai-ready, account holders could migrate to quantum-safe accounts, but transactions would carry higher fees because post-quantum signatures are larger. Layer-2 networks could use post-quantum calldata as a fallback, although Ethlabs does not propose requiring all rollups to switch immediately.
Why Ethlabs Says 2027
Ethlabs’ central argument is that Ethereum should respond to the direction of technological progress rather than wait for a precise date when a particular threat might emerge. Its proposal points to governments and technology companies bringing forward their post-quantum cryptography plans.
The lab says the US government has moved its quantum-risk target from 2035 to 2030. That comparison needs qualification: the broader federal migration framework has different deadlines for different systems and cryptographic functions. A June 2026 executive order requires specified federal high-value and high-impact systems to transition to post-quantum cryptography for key establishment by December 2030 and digital signatures by December 2031. The National Security Memorandum 10 framework had previously established 2035 as the broader target for federal systems. The White House order and NIST’s October 2026 migration guidance outline the distinction.
Google has set a 2029 target for full post-quantum readiness across Google Cloud, according to its August 2026 roadmap. The company said it is already transitioning internal infrastructure and customer-facing services to post-quantum algorithms.
Ethlabs also says the Ethereum Foundation has moved its own post-quantum resistance target from 2029 to 2028. That claim requires a distinction: Justin Drake expressed a December 2028 ambition at Devcon, but the Foundation’s published September roadmap still sets December 2029 as its formal target for full quantum resistance across Ethereum’s execution, consensus and data layers. The Foundation has said it will reassess quantum progress with outside experts in January 2027.
On the AI side, Ethlabs cites OpenAI’s reported use of an internal frontier model to find and patch roughly 1,000 Linux vulnerabilities. It also points to AI systems making progress on open mathematics problems, which it says raises questions about the long-term security of cryptographic primitives. The lab characterises a break of today’s cryptography through AI as unlikely, but not impossible. These are arguments made by Ethlabs in support of its proposed timetable, not evidence that current cryptographic systems have already been compromised.
The lab also points to how quickly AI capabilities have developed. It says that when FOCIL and Frames were initially scoped for Hegotá in January, Anthropic’s Claude Opus 4.5 was the frontier model. Ethlabs argues that the acceleration cuts both ways: AI could increase the scale of software vulnerability discovery, but it could also help developers with core protocol work and formal verification.
How It Compares With What Was Said at Devcon 8
Post-quantum security was a major theme at Devcon 8, held November 3–6 at the Jio World Centre in Mumbai. Ethlabs’ proposal sets a 2027 target, earlier than the December 2028 ambition Ethereum Foundation researcher Justin Drake outlined at the conference.
On opening day, Drake said he hoped Ethereum could complete its full post-quantum and post-AI transition by December 2028. He also put the probability of a cryptographically relevant quantum computer at 10% by 2029 and 50% by 2032, and described quantum computing as a national-security issue. He said developers had 24 months to ship three forks after Glamsterdam.
The following day, during an audience Q&A, Drake said the cryptography itself was progressing but the fork schedule remained a constraint. He argued that if core developers collectively made post-quantum security their highest short-term priority, Ethereum could become post-quantum secure within months rather than waiting until the end of 2028. Ethlabs’ proposal seeks precisely that kind of reprioritisation.
In the same session, Drake said that an estimated 10% to 15% of all Bitcoin had been lost, compared with less than 1% of ether, in the context of discussing potential quantum-related risks to exposed public keys. He suggested Bitcoin could eventually consider freezing Satoshi Nakamoto’s coins to address the threat. Those figures and the proposed response were Drake’s remarks, not independently established measurements or an adopted Bitcoin policy.
Moreover, in an exclusive interview with The Crypto Times, Drake spoke with the publication’s Founder and CEO Hardik Katariya about Ethereum’s post-quantum work across three layers: execution, consensus, and data. He discussed the scale of the challenge, covering roughly 10 million wallets, 10,000 validators and about 10 major rollups. In a second clip, he explained how a quantum or AI attacker could potentially use an exposed public key to recover the corresponding private key.
The three timelines reflect different levels of commitment. Ethlabs’ pqai27 is a community proposal that aims for pqai-ready Ethereum in 2027, with pqai-scaled as a stretch goal. Drake’s December 2028 date is an ambition he expressed at Devcon, not a formal revision of the Foundation’s roadmap. The Ethereum Foundation’s published plan still sets December 2029 as its target for quantum resistance across the execution, consensus and data layers, subject to reassessment with outside experts in January 2027.
Who Ethlabs Is, and How Ethereum Got Here
Ethlabs launched in June 2026, founded by five former Ethereum Foundation researchers: Ansgar Dietrichs, Barnabé Monnot, Caspar Schwarz-Schilling, Josh Rudolf and Julian Ma. Its backers include ETH treasury firms BitMine and SharpLink and Consensys founder Joe Lubin, according to its launch announcement.
The proposal comes as the Ethereum Foundation accelerates its quantum-security work. It formed a dedicated post-quantum team in January and later shifted from the Poseidon hash toward SHA or BLAKE. It is also developing a post-quantum public-key registry for validators.
The timeline faces practical constraints. On November 6, the Foundation paused Glamsterdam’s Hoodi testnet fork after developers identified potential smart-contract compatibility risks involving EIP-8037 and EIP-8038. It said Hegotá development would continue in parallel, but did not announce a new Hoodi activation or Glamsterdam mainnet date. The Foundation’s update adds context to Ethlabs’ push to make Hegotá the priority for post-quantum security.
What Happens Next
pqai27 remains a proposal, not an approved development schedule. Its 2027 target depends on core developers agreeing to prioritize post-quantum security, resolving technical questions around consensus and account signatures, and completing implementation and security testing.
Developers still need to determine Hegotá’s scope through the All Core Developers process. The Ethereum Foundation has also said it plans to reassess quantum risk with outside experts in January 2027.
The near-term issues to watch are whether developers reduce or defer FOCIL’s role in Hegotá to protect the proposed 2027 timeline, which post-quantum consensus design they choose, and when Glamsterdam receives a revised Hoodi testnet schedule.
Ethlabs’ broader ambition is for Ethereum to become post-quantum, post-AI, faster and more censorship-resistant by the end of 2028. For now, pqai27 is a push to change the network’s development priorities, not a confirmed deadline for Ethereum’s transition.
Also Read: Ethereum Researchers Simplify Their First Post-Quantum Upgrade Proposal EIP-8450
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